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American Indians and the Burger Court*
John R. Hermann, Trinity University
Karen O'Connor, The American University

Objective. Like many politically disadvantaged groups, American lndian in
terests have turned to the courts when they lack access or clout in the electoral
process. Unlike many ocher disadvantaged groups, rhe litigation activities of
American Indian interests have failed to garner much scholarly attention. The
purpose of this research is to examine how American Indian interests fared
before rhe Burger Courr (1969-85 October terms). Methods. The 63 full opin
ion cases regarding issues critical to American Indian inrerests were identified
by examining the United States Reports. Each case was coded as whether or
nor che Courr decided in favor of the parry advancing American Indian inter
esrs. Results. American Indian interests won over one-half of the cases decided
by the Burger Court during the 1969-85 terms. Additionally, the appellant
status of the party advancing American Indian interests and the issue area being
litigated were important determinants in the direction of the Burger Court's
decisions. Co11cl11sio11s. While American Indian interests won more cases than
they lost dming the 1969-85 terms, the Burger Court's decisions did not result
in a coherent body of law.

Researchers long have tudied group who try to achieve their policy
preferences in the courts when they lack access or clout in the electoral
process (Cortner, '1 968; Edsall and Edsall, 1 99 1; Lawrence, 1 990;
O'Connor, 1980; O'Connor and Epstein, 1 982, 1 983; Sorauf, 1 976;
Vose, 1 95 9 ) . Like many other groups, American Indians have also
turned to the courts to lobby for their interests. Yet, their efforts failed
to garner much scholarly attention (but see Deloria and Lytle [ 1 9 83J,
Shattuck and Norgren I 1 979, 1 991 J, Wilkins I 1990], and Wunder

1 1 9941 ) .
Because so few poli tical scientists have examined the interests of
American Indians or American Indians as an interest group of any
kind-let alone how they are treated in the American legal system
we offer this preliminary study of how American Indian interests fared
in the Burger Court to find out if they were treated differently by the
Supreme Court than other disadvantaged groups.
American Indian cases began to rece i ve far more attention from the
•
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Court during the Burger Court years. Almost simultaneously with the
development of the California Indian Legal Services {CILS) and the
Native American Rights Fund {NARF), the Supreme Court decided
more American Indian cases (35) in the 1970s than in any other pre
vious decade in the Court's history {Wilkinson, 1987: 2). Additionally,
while more than 95 percent of certiorari petitions failed to win review
during the 1969-85 terms, approximately 25 percent (n
394) of
American Indian cases, as defined as such by U.S. Law Week, were
granted plenary review.
The explosion in federal Indian law occurred in the wake of litigation
on behalf of other minority or disadvantaged groups, including African
Americans, women, and Hispanics. Although American Indians are
truly a disadvantaged minority in terms of a sense of powerlessness,
numbers, racial or cultural characteristics, and a sense of group soli
darity, their status as citizens in separate tribal nations gives them a
unique political status that is different from that of other disadvan
taged groups. Thus, the relationship between the United States gov
ernment and the Indian tribes is also a political one, not a racial one,
per se. Because American Indian activities are regulated primarily by
the federal government (and not the states), the U.S. Supreme Court
plays an especially important role in the Court's assessment of Indian
rights. Although the federal government clearly does not exercise the
degree of control over Indians and tribes that it did in earlier periods,
it still plays an important role in the regulation of day-to-day Indian
affairs.
In spite of this racial/political difference, we opt here to treat Amer
ican Indians in the context of the body of literature that exists con
cerning politically disadvantaged groups' use of litigation to achieve
their policy goals. To that end, we ask three questions: First, how often
did the U.S. Supreme Court decide in favor of American Indian inter
ests during the 1969-85 terms? Second, did the interests of American
Indians fare better when their position was advanced by appellants in
the litigation? Third, what type of American Indian issues dominated
the Court's agenda and did the Court's support for American Indians
vary based on the issue presented? But, before we address these ques
tions, we offer an overview of the historical context in which to place
the Burger Court decisions.
=

Historical Background
The Fonnative Years: 1776-1830. During the embryonic years of
the United States, the national government's policies toward American
Indians generally aimed at acquiring lndian lands through treaties and
expanding Congress's authority over American Indian affairs through

American Indians and the Burger Court

129

a series of Trade and Intercourse Acts. By 1 790, almost every American
Indian tribe along the eastern seaboard had negotiated a treaty with
the United States. Most of these treaties had the same theme. The set
tlers were prohibited from taking American Indian lands and the tribes
were not allowed to enter into all iances or engage in land trades with
foreign nations (Wunder, 1 994: 1 9 ) .
The U.S. Constitution offers l ittle guidance concerning the relation
ship between American Indians and the United States.1 American In
dians are explicitly mentioned only three times in the Constitution.
Article l, Section 2, and later, the Fourteenth Amendment, excluded
American Indians from being taxed by Congress or the states.2 More
over, Article I, Section 8, stipulates that Congress has the authority to
"regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes."
ln addition to the enumerated legislative powers explicitly men
tioned in Article I, there are many implicit powers given to the legis
lative and executive branches over American Indians. The "property
clause" in Article TV allows Congress to dispose of and make all rules
regarding the federal government's property, including American In
dians' lands. The "necessary and proper clause" in Article I, Section
8, authorizes Congress to enforce its enumerated powers. The "war
powers clauses" in the ame article give the federal government power
to wage wars against American Indians.3 The "supremacy clause" in
Article VI gives the federal government authority over the states in
regulating Indian affairs. And, the "treaty clause" in Article II, Section
2 , gives the president the power to negotiate treaties with American
Indians with the advice and consent of the Senate.4
In essence, the Constitution offered a rough outline of the new gov
ernment's authority over American Indian affairs. It is through the
interpretation of the Constitution by Congress, the executive, and the
courts, however, that the parameters of these powers are clarified. The
Marshall Court took the leading role in defining the central tenets of
federal Indian law through its interpretation of the Constitution and
statutory law.
Through a trilogy of cases, Chief Justice John Marshall's Federalist
alJegiances were revealed, and the Court's belief that Indian nations
1 For a more detailed discussion of American Indians and rhe U.S. Consrirurion, see
Cohen ( 1982: 207-28) and Wunder (1994: 19-21 ).
2 Article I, Section 2, srares that "Reprcsencarives and direct raxes shall be apporcioned
among rhe several states which may be included within this Union, according to rhcir
respective Numbers ... excluding Lndians not taxed."
3 Sec clauses I, 11, and 12 of Article I, ecuon 8.
4 From the outset, the Bill of Rights did nor apply ro American Indians, as they "were
considered both pre-Bill of R1ghrs and extra-Bill of Rights" (Wunder, 1994: 21 ).
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were subservient to the national government was enunciated.5 The
model created by these cases "can be described broadly as calling for
largely autonomous tribal governments subject to an overriding federal
authority but free from state control" (Wilkinson, 1987: 24) .6
The Marshall trilogy continues as the dominant precedent and stan
dard by which the Court interprets the relationship between American
Indians and the United States. The model also defines the trust rela
tionship between American Indians and the federal government. The
federal government has virtually unfettered authority over American
Indians, yet it has a special relationship or even an obligation to act i n
rhei r best interests.
Indian Removal and Reservation Life: 1830-80. In the early nine
teenth century, as the United States tried to accommodate the west
ward movement of the white <;ettlers, it also attempted to avoid the
potential conflicts between the whites and the American Indians.; The
United Stares' solution was to pressure the American Indians to sur
render their lands through treaties. Virtually every treaty entered into
during this period involved removing American Indians from the east
ern part of the United States to lands west of the Mississippi River.
While many tribes were willing to relinquish their lands through trea
ties, m:my resisted, including the Choctaws and the Cherokees.
Voluntary migration was no longer a viable option for the American
Indians when Andrew Jackson was elected president in 1828. He
promised to move the Indians westward and persuaded Congress to
pass the Indian Removal Act of 1830. The Act forced the American
Indians to move west of the Mississippi River, and those who resisted
were subject to state criminal and civil jurisdiction. While the Chero
kees' "trail of rears'' is the most well-known tribal indignity, many
other Indian tribes endured similar horrifying experiences including
the Chippewas, Choctaws, Creeks, and Chickasaws (Foreman,
1932: 21-28).
Beginning in the 1850s, with the rise of industrialization coupled
with westward expansion, the United States government isolated [n
dians on reservations, confiscated their lands, and denied chem basic
political rights. Indian reservations were administered by the federal
government, and Indians usually lived in substandard conditions.
In 187 L, moreover, Congress passed the Appropriations Act
5Thc rrilO&')' con;"red of Johnson v. Mclnrosh ( 1823), Cherokee Nation u. Georgia
( 183 l ), and Worcester v. Georgia ( 1832), ofrcn caUed rhe Marshall trilogy.
6 By "overriding federal aurhority," we mean rhac Congress has broad powers over
American Indian affairs or what courts often rcrm the ''plenary power" of Congress, bur
these powers are "not synonymous wirh 'absolute' or 'total' "(Cohen, 1982: 219).
"Thi; discussion relics upon Cohen ( 1982: 78-821, Prucha (1984: 184-200), and
Washburn (197Sb: 16S-69).
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(Prucha 1 975: L36). The Act prevented any further formal treaty mak
ing between the United States and American Indians although, as
Cohen ( 1 9 82) noted, the United States continues to negotiate dozens
of agreements with Indian tribes that have a imilar effect. Most com
mentators agree that the central reason for the termination of treaty
making was because the House of Repre entatives wanted to play a
more instrumental role in the regulation of American Indian affairs
(Fritz, 1 976 : 85; Prucha, 1 974 : 67- 70) .
During this period, the U.S. Supreme Court reasserted and expanded
on the key principles pronounced in the Marshall trilogy. Congress's
authority was expanded through two liquor cases: U.S. v. Holliday
( 1 865) and U.S. v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey ( 1 876). In both,
the Court gave Congress authority to regulate the sale and consump
tion of alcohol by American Indians. Congress's authority to regulate
alcohol was justified, according to the Court, by the commerce clause
and Congress's police powers to regulate for the health, safety, and
morality of American Indians. On the other hand, states till possessed
limited power in regulating the tribes. In the Kansas Indians decision
( 1 8 86), for example, the Court held that the Shawnees could not be
taxed by the tare of Kansas. Thus, Congress' authority over Ameri
can Indians seemed to have few constraints, whereas the states contin
ued to play a nominal role in regul::ic ing their affair .
Assimilation: 1880-1928. fn the 1 880s, the federal government be
gan to promote assimilation over separation. The assimilation move
ment's central goal was to destroy tribal culture and ab orb American
Indians into mai nstream American culture. The assimilation move
ment was partially triggered in respon e ro the Court's decision i n Ex
/Jarte Crow Dog ( J 883 ) . In this case, Crow Dog murdered Spotted
Tail, the chief of the Sioux nation. In accordance with certain Sioux
tribal customs, Crow Dog paid the relatives of Spotted Tail fifty dol
lars, eight hor es, and a blanket as re titution for his crime. The District
Attorney for the South Dakota Territory, however, tried Crow Dog in
federal district court, where he was found guilty of first degree murder
and ordered to be hanged. Crow Dog appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, and Justice Stanley Matthews, writing for the Court, held rhat
the federal courts had no jurisdiction over crimes committed between
Indians in Indian country.
Outraged by the Court's deci ion, Congres passed the Major
Crimes Acr of 1 8 85 .8 The Act made it a federal offense, rather than a
tribal offense, for American Indians tO commit one of any seven crimes
on the re ervation: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to
kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.
RThis discussion relics on \X/ashhurn

( l 975b:271 ).
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In an even more significant step toward assimilation, Congress
passed the General Al lotment Act or Dawes Act (named after the spon
sor of the bill) of 1887.9 Its purpose was to end communal ownership
of the tribes and encourage private ownership. Each American Indian
family was given a certain acreage of land and the surplus land was
sold to whites. lt is estimated chat Indian lands were reduced from
about 140 million acres to less than 52 million (Wilkinson, 1987: 20).
In commenting on the ramifications of chis Act to Congress in 1901,
President Theodore Roosevelt characterized it is "a mighty pulverizing
engine to break up the tribal mass" (Washburn, 1975: 242). To foster
"assimilation" further, American Indian children were sent to board
ing schools away from the reservations, native languages and rituals
were banned on reservations, and, in 1924, American Indians were
made U.S. citizens and granted the right to vote. Like what happened
to the earlier enfranchised African Americans, several states (i.e., Utah,
Arizona, and New Mexico) continually attempted to prevent American
Indians from voting through a variety of methods, including residency
requirements, lack of state power over Indian conduct, language re
quirements, and guardianship (Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 222-26; Price,
1973: 229-3 7).
During the assimilation era, the Supreme Court legitimized Con
gress's "allotment" agenda by holding that Congress's authority over
American Indians was plenary.10 More precisely, the "Court recog
nized a seemingly unlimited federal power to alter tribal property and
jurisdictional prerogatives contemplated by the treaties and treaty stat
utes" (Wilkinson, 1987: 24).
Many scholars define the assimilation era as one of the darkest in
the history of American Indians. Many progressives, however, took on
the cause of Indian welfare and helped to form many American Indian
groups, although these groups often reflected progressive movement
goals.11 The National Indian Association, Indian Citizenship Commit
tee of Boston, Indian Rights Association, and the National Indian De
fense Association all were created to lobby (in some form) to protect
the general welfare of American Indians. These groups published let
ters, sponsored missions, conducted investigations, and lobbied Con
gress on behalf of American Indians.
Indian Reorgattization: 1928-42. The 1920s and 1930s brought a
new enthusiasm for American Indian auconomy and a disdain for the
assimilationist policies of the allotment era (Cohen, 1982: 144). The
federal government began to reappraise the conditions of American
a more detailed discussion of the Dawes Acr, sec Washburn (1975a).
10 Sec United States v. Ktlgnma ( 1886), United States v. McBratney ( 1881), and Lone

9 For

Wol(v. Hitchcock

(1903).

11 This discussion relics heavil u on Ha an ( 1993: 135-36).
y p
g
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lndians.12 The Merriam Report of 1 92 8 found that the assimilation
policies were a dismal failure and that most American Indians lived in
abject poverty. American I ndians lacked basic health care, illiteracy
was rampant, annual incomes were below the poverty level, and the
population of American Indians had reached a historical low.
To address these problems, President Franklin 0. Roosevelt ap
pointed John Collier, a champion of the Indian cause and an officer of
the National Indian Defense Association, as Commissioner of Indian
Affairs. Collier lobbied Congress and President Roosevelt for a reso
lution to end the assimilationist policies and to promote Indian sov
ereignty. Col lier's dedication to the American Indian cause, when cou
pled with the Merriam Report, prompted Congress to pass the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934. The Act repealed the Allotment Act, en
couraged community ownership and tribal culture, and gave American
Indians preferential treatment for government positions in Indian
service.
Termination: 1943-67. World War II brought an end to the short
lived trial of Indian revival. In an effort to support World War II, the
United States cut the domestic budget-and the budget for American
Indians was also trimmed.13 The Eisenhower administration requested
that the Hoover Commission recommend cost savings programs. The
Commission suggested that the federal government transfer most of its
Indian programs to the states. Pre idem Eisenhower also appointed
Dillon S. Myer as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Myer was a strong
proponent of the termination movement, and his past government ex
perience included supervising the relocation camps of Japanese Amer
icans during World War LI (Wunder, 1994: 100).
The termination movement reached full stride when Congress passed
Public Law 280, which allowed five states with exceptions, for the first
time, to maintain both criminal and civil jurisdiction over American
Indians. The trust relationship between the tribes and United States
was also severed in these five states.
With a separate American Indian agenda, the Warren Court, how
ever, limited the parameters of the termination policy by safeguarding
Indian sovereignty. In Williams v. Lee (1959), Justice Hugo Black,
writing for the majority, held that Arizona could not regulate contracts
between Indians and non-Indians on reservation lands. Instead, the
Court held that the Navajo tribe had exclusive judicial jurisdiction over
such disputes. And, in Menominee Tribe of lndians v. United States
12This discussion relics upon Deloria and Lyde ( 1983: 13-20), Philip (1977: 113-34),
and Wunder (1994: 146).
llThis discussion relies upon Cohen (1982: 152-80) and Wunder (1994: I 00-108).

134

Social Science Quarterly

( 1968), justice Douglas found that termination did not mean the ab
rogation of existing treaty rights for tribes. Thus, the Warren Court
took a leading role in hastening the end of the termination era.
Self-Determination: 1968-Present. It was not until the 1960s, at the
same time when other groups including women were beginning to mo
bilize for greater civil rights, that Indians also began to mobilize
(Shattuck and Norgren, 1979: 5-15). Perhaps Indian groups' most im
portant achievement during this period was their ability in helping to
garner the necessary support for the codification of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, which prohibited states from assuming jurisdiction
in Indian country (amending Public Law 280) yet also allowed most
amendments of the Bill of Rights to apply in Indian country.'4
Although the Indian Civil Rights Act stands out as a prominent vic
tory for many, some Indian groups did not perceive its passage as a
victory and took measures to draw attention to what they perceived
as continued legal inequalities. Like the civil rights and women's rights
movements, American Indians had a more radical as well as a more
traditional branch. The radical movement was led by young American
Indian groups who came predominantly from urban areas (Wunder,
1994: 157). Jn the late 1960s, for example, members of the American
Indian Movement (AIM) seized Alcatraz Island cbiming it ::i.s p::i.rt of
their aboriginal lands (Costello, 1980: 58-59). In the summer of 1972,
AIM planned the "trail of broken treaties." AIM caravanned from
Minneapolis to Washington, D.C., and organized a "sit-in" at the Bu
reau of Indian Affairs (Wunder, 1994: 158). And, in 1973, national
attention was drawn to the plight of American Indians when AIM took
over Wounded Knee, South Dakota, the site of the massacre of 150
Indians by the United States military in 1 890 (Costello, 1980: 59).
Several American Indians, however, took a more traditional avenue
in redressing their grievances. Many l ndians were attracted to the study
of law at the American Indian Law Center at the University of New
Mexico. Soon, the clinic there as well as graduates of its programs
began to file hundreds of test cases in the federal courts. Around the
same time, the Native American Rights Fund (NARF} was founded in
1970 in Boulder, Colorado. ft quickly became the NAACP LDF of the
Indian rights movement as the "courts became the forum of choice for
Indian tribes and their members" (Strickland, 1992: 579). Thus, the
Burger Court became a central actor in the formation of American
Indian policy.
14T1rle II of rhe Indian Civil Righrs Act applies the First, Fourrh, Fifth, Sixrh, and
Eighth Amendments and the Fourreenth AmenJmcnc's equal protecrion clause to Indian
country. Additionally, no bill of arcninder or ex posr facto laws can be exercised on mbal
lands. For a more derailed discussion of the Indian Civil Right� Acr, sec, for example,
Wunder ( 1994: 124-46).
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American Indian cases heard by the Burger Court are diverse: they
range from cases involving hunting, fishing, and land rights to those
involving civil rights. Thus, when we analyze American Indian success
rates in the Court, the kinds of issues present in each case are important
factors to be considered.
Methods
The 63 full opinion cases regarding American Indians decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court during the J 969-85 terms were identified by ex
amining the United States Reports.15 American Indian cases are defined
here as ones that include American Indians as individual a well as
American Indian tribes, or those cases where the United States govern
ment is claiming to advance American Indian interests or to protect
that trust relationship. The aim of this study i to examine collectively
how the interests of American Indians and tribes are protected or ad
vanced by Supreme Court litigation.1"
Success and success rates are operationalized as whether or not the
Court decided in favor of the party advancing American Indian inter
e ts. More specifically, our dependent varia ble is dichotomous ( I
in
favor of American Indian interests; 0
against American Indian in
terests}.17 Success rates were computed by dividing the number of cases
in which the Court supported American Indian claims by the total
population of case . Theoretically, these score can range from 0 to J .
=

=

1 5 A lisr of these cases i s available b y conc:icring rhe authors. Per c.:uriam decisions were
excluded from this analysi . We specifically chose not ro use the Spaerh dara base because
the Spaeth data operationalize American Indian cases as those where American Indians
arc a parry. We, in contrast, examine all cases rhar had an impact on American Indian
inri.-rcsrs, including those cases where the federal government is a parry in a c.:ase on behalf
of American Indian interests.
16The reader should he mindful rhar American Indians as individuals and Indian tribe�
as nations is a fundamental distinction that is crincal ro understanding federal Indian
law. For purposes of this srudy, however, we have chosen ro examine all cases involving
issues thar are crucial ro American Indian interests without reference 10 this distinction
because rhe purpose of rhi� srudy is ro determine how American Indian interests have
fored in rhe Burger Court-irrespective of rribal or individual inreresrs.
Moreover, ro begin ro am1lyzc rhe dara any diffcrenrly would nor :illow us ro make
any meaningful comparisons. For example, in our data scr of 59 cases, we found that
the Court supported individual Indian lirigants in 52 percent of rhc 21 cases and tribes
in 52 percenr of the 25 c.1ses. And, in cases where the federal governmenr rcprescnred an
individual Indian litigant, the Court's support rares were 71 percent (11 = 7); in cases
where the federal government represenred tribe!>, however, rhe Court's support rares were
0 percent (11 = 3). Still, in cases where a non-Indian parry advanced an Indian interesr,
the Court'> support rares were 66 perccnr (11 = .3). Thus, given rhc small number of cases
under analysis, making rhesi.- kinds of distincrions is nor practical here.
17 Four cases were excluded from the analysis because rhey were split decisions. 1.n
c.:ascs where rhe parries were Indian versus mbe. the rribe was coded in favor of Ameri an
Indian interesr . This coding scheme avoided any coding biases and reflect!> our belief
that rhe community interest outweighs the individual interest.
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The same calculations were made for each justice to calculate individ
ual support rates.
Success Rates. As revealed i n Table 1, American Indians won 53
percent of the 59 cases decided by the Burger Court. Considerable
variation exists among the individual justices' support rates for Amer
ican Indian claims. Justices Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stewart supported American Indian claims in over 50 percent of
the cases, whereas Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, Stevens, and
Rehnquist all had support rates of less than 50 percent. Justice Douglas
had the h ighest support rates, 94 percent (n = 16). In contrast, Justice
Rehnquisr's support rate for American Indians was less than 33 percent
55).
(n
In the case of Justice Douglas, his liberal tendencies have been well
documented (Rohde and Spaeth, 1976: 143; Segal and Spaeth,
1993: 252-53). His love of the land and his support for American
Indian interests are also well known (Johnson, 1990: 191-97;
Wilkinson, 1990: 233-45). Johnson ( 1990), for example, noted that
Justice Douglas was "an ardent supporter of tribal self-determination
and a firm believer that agreements with Indian tribes should be con
strued in favor of the Indians, and should be upheld" (p. 206). More
interesting is the uncharacteristic low support for American Indian
interests by the usually more liberal Justice Stevens. O'Connor and
Epstein ( 1983: 328), for example, found Justice Stevens to support
=

TABLE 1
Court's and Justices' Support for American Indian Cases: 1969-85 Terms

Support Rates

Support Rates
as Appellant

Support Rates
as Respondent

N

%

N

%

N

%

Court

59

52.5%

28

75%

31

32.2%

Douglas
Marshall
Brennan
Blackmun
Stewart
Burger
Harlan
White
Powell
O'Connor
Stevens
Rehnquist
Black

16
58
57
56
38
58
2
59
51
21
42
55
3

93.8
74 1
71.9
60.7
55.3
50.0
50.0
45.8
43.1
42.9
38.1
30.9
00

13
28
26
25
26
28
1
28
24
2
14
25
2

100.0
89.3
88.5
68.0
65.4
75.0
100.0
60.7
66.7
100.0
42.9
52.0
0.0

3
30
31
31
12
30
1
31
27
19
28
30
1

66.7
60 0
58.1
54.8
33.3
26.7
0.0
32.3
22.2
36.8
35.7
13.0
00

Court and
Justices
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gender-based claim in 57 percent of the cases. Other studies have
found him to be among the most l iberal on the Court during the Burger
Court era (Heck, 1981: L97; Goldman, 1982: 542).
One might hypothesize that justices from "western or southwestern
stares," such as Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, might be better ac
quainted with the plight of American Indians and, thus, be more sym
pathetic to their claims. Thar was not the case. Justice O'Connor's
support for gender-based claims, for example, was 67 percent, while
it was only 43 percent for American Indians. Justice Rehnquist's low
support for American Indian claims was consistent with his generally
.low support for disadvantaged groups. [n fact, he was more supportive
of American Indian claims (31 percent) than for gender-based claims
(O'Connor and Epstein, 1983: 328)- 16 percent-at least before
Justice O'Connor came on the Court. O'Connor and Segal ( 1990: 100)
found that Justice Rehnquist's support for gender-based claims in
creased to 50 percent after Justice O'Connor came on the Court.
Interestingly, Justice Burger's support rate were much higher for
American Indian claimants than for African Americans or claims in
volving gender. Burger supported American Indian claims in 58 per
cent of the 19 cases during the 1972-76 terms, while he supported
African American litigants in only 34 percent of the 65 cases examined
by Ulmer and Thomson ( 198 1 :449) during the same time period. Sim
ilarly, Burger's support for American Indian claims were much higher
(5 1 percent in 39 cases) than for gender-based claims (25 percent in
68 cases) (O'Connor and Epstein, 1983: 328).
Support Sco1'es as an Appellant. The Court's tendency to decide in
favor of appellants is well documented (Baum, 1976, 1977, 1979;
Epstein and O'Connor, 1988; George and Epstein, 1992; Salokar,
1992; Sheehan, Songer, and Mischler, 1992). Many argue that the
justices employ an "error correcting" trategy; that is, the justices take
cases when they "seek to 'correct errors' in the lower courts by voting
to grant a hearing whenever a lower-court decision departed signifi
cantly from their most preferred doctrinal position" (Baum, 1977: 14).
American Indians clearly benefited when they were the appellant. As
indicated in Table 1, the Court supported American Indian claimants
in 75 percent of those cases. In sharp contrast, the Court's support fell
to less than a third (32.2 percent) when American Indians were the
respondent.
The individual justices were also more supportive of American In
dians as the appellant. With the exceptions of Justices Black and
Stevens, every justice supported American Indians as an appellant in
over 50 percent of the cases. Further, when we controlled for when
American Indians were the appellants, the low support rates by Justices
Stevens and O'Connor may be explained. In the 2 1 cases in which
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O'Connor participated, American Indians were the appellant in only
about 10 percent. In the case of Justice Stevens, American Indians were
the appellants in only a third of the 42 cases in which he participated.
Stevcns's and O'Connor's support races may have been higher if Amer
ican Indian claimants were che appellant in a greater number of cases.
Issue Areas and Support Rates. Table 2 reveals the kinds and dis
tribution of issue areas in which American Indian cases fall. Four is
sues-land claims, natural resources, taxation, and what we term pro
cedure/jurisdiction, which are cases that involve questions peculiar to
tribal claims or the status of Indian reservations-make up just under
90 percent of the cases decided by che Burger Court. The kinds of cases
heard by the Court involving American Indians are quite different than
those involving African Americans and women. Unlike those of other
politically disadvantaged groups, American Indians cases did not pri
marily involve traditional civil rights or liberties issues-at least during
the Burger Court era. As a politically disadvantaged group, American
Indian interests are unique and diverse in relation ro their counterparts.
As Table 2 suggests, the success rates of American Indian claimants
varied considerably based on the issue area being litigated. In land
claims, American Indians enjoyed a 50 percent (n
16) success rate.
One of the most important victories for American Indians in this arena
was in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation ( 1985). At issue
was the validity of a 1795 agreement between the Oneida Nation and
New York regarding the transfer of land to the state because the trans
fer did not have the required prior federal approval. In a 5 to 4 deci
sion, the Court held that the 175-year-old agreement was invalid,
which allowed the Oneida nation a federal common law right to sue
for a breach of its possessory rights ro aboriginal lands.
In the procedure/jurisdiction arena, American Indian claimants won
=

TABLE 2
Court's Support Rates

Issue
Land claims
Natural resources
Procedure/junsdicllon
Tax
Civil rights/civil liberties
Other
Criminal
Total

for Different American

N
16
13
13
10
4
2
1
59

Indian Issues: 1969-85

Distribution
of Issues

Support Rates

(%)

(%)

27.1%
22.0
22.0
17.0
6.8
3.4
1.7
100.0

50%
38.5
53.8
80 0
50.0
0.0
100 0
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5 4 percenr of the 1 3 cases. Their success may be cred ited i n large part
to their appellant status. American Indians were the appellants in 69
percent of the procedure/jurisdiction case . An i llustrative example of
a procedure/jurisdiction case is Kennerly v. District Court ( 1 97 1 ). The
Kennerly Court struck down Montana's assertion that it possessed
judicial jurisdiction regarding a civil contract between an Indian and
non-Indian on a re ervation.
In the area of natural resou rces, American Indians were nor as suc
cessful a in land or procedure/jurisdiction claims. They won only 39
percent (11 = 1 3) of their cases. The low success rates in natural re
source cases may be attri buted to the Court's preference to defer to the
rates' and Congress's police powers to preserve scarce resources al
though resources are al o critical to the survival of some tribes, as
tribes. For example, in United States v. Dion ( 1 98 6 ) the Court held
chat, pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act, American Indians were pro
hibited from hunting eagles.
In contrast, American Indian enjoyed a very high success rare in
taxation case , 80 percent (11 = 1 0) . Most of these cases involved at
tempts by states to rax individuals who resided in Indian country. This
high success rate may be due to a long line of precedent established by
rhe Court as well as by codification of these principles in the Tndian
Civil Rights Act of 1 96 8 . The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1 968 prohibits
state jurisdiction on tribal lands, unle s consent is attained by Congress
or the affected tribe.IS Further, since Worcester v. Georgia ( 1 832), the
Court has usually held that states would play a limited role in the
regulation of Indian affairs in lndian country. As the Court held in
McClanahan v. A rizona State Tax Commission ( 1 973), this principle
also applie to state taxation.
Discussion
While some justice appear to di like American Indian case (see
Woodward and Arm trong [ 1 979 : 359, 4 1 2j), at least rwo justices
from the Burger Court placed great importance on American Indian
cases. Said one justice: "We now have three westerners on the Court
and we are very concerned about . . . Indian cases. And you can tell
by our votes for cert that we are interested in them" (Perry, 1 99 1 : 26 1 ) .
Another justice stared: "Actually, I think the Indian cases are kind of
fascinating. It goe into history and you learn about it, and the way
we abused some of the Indians, we rhat is the U.S. government" (Perry,
1 99 1 : 262). Yer, that fascination ha nor necessarily resulted in a co
herent body of law.
IS

For :in exrended discu.,s1on of rhc lnd1:111 Civil

(1982:202-4).

Ridus
i

A1:r

( 1 968),

sec Cohen
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As noted earlier, American Indian cases are different than those in
volving other minority groups. The issues of federal preemption and/
or inherenr tribal sovereignty permeate most cases irrespective of issue
area. Thus, unlike the bodies of law that have developed as the Court
has addressed issues of race and gender-based discrimination over the
years, the range of issues presented by American Indian interests to the
Court have resulted in little doctrinal coherence and, thus, mixed suc
cess rates. One author has noted that Justice Stewart was supposed to
have remarked at a visit at Boalt Law School that "any case the Court
decides in Indian law is stillborn and has no precedential value"
( Pelcyger, 1 983 : 3 1 ) More recently, one former attorney at the Native
American Rights Fund remarked with some dismay,
.

I have one per peeve. Since White Mountain Apache

i1.

Bracker [ 1 9801,

rhe Court said they were going to decide each case on a case-by-case basis.
As an attorney, try to tell a company to do business in Indian country and
what the law is when the Court decides issues on a case-by-case basis.
This is a terrible view, an ad hoc view, (which

is l

devised for state juris

diction over tribes. [Th1sj conflicrs with our understanding of Indian law.
They, [the jusrices,) should follow Worcester. Companies are now scared
to go on reservations with no firm idea of how the Court will decide cases.
The Indian commerce cla use shields lndian tribes from state [jurisdicrionj.
(Author interview, 20 May

1994)

This case-by-case approach undoubtedly is reflected in the mixed suc
cess rates of American Indian interests in Court.
Just as important as their overall success rates, however, are the
nature and impact of individual cases on the status of American Indi
ans. American Indians, for example, were dealt a stunning blow in
Oliphant u. Suquamish Tribe ( 1 978) when the Court struck down
tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian
country thereby adversely affecting their efforts to preserve excl usive
jurisdiction on reservations (especially in cases involving state jurisdic
tion). Similarly, in Rice LI. Rehner ( 1 98 3 ) the Court dealt tribal sov
ereignty another blow when it upheld concurrent tribal and state reg
ulation of on-reservation sales of alcoholic beverages. And, in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation

( 1 980), the Court upheld a state cigarette tax on reservation sales by
a tribe to non-Indians. All three cases symbolized a retreat from the
Marshall trilogy.
In sharp comparison, in Santa Clara Pueblo LI. Martinez ( 1 978), the
Court held that a tribe had authority to choose the criteria for its
membership, even if it may have violated a competing gender-based
equal protection claim. Later, in White Mountain Apache v. Bracker
( 1 980), the Court struck down state motor license and fuel use taxes
on a non-Indian corporation engaged in logging activities in Indian
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country. Moreover, i n Ramah Navajo School Board v. Board of R ev
enue ( 1 982), the Court struck down a state tax on a non-Indian cor
poration building a school facility in Indian country.
These decisions highlight the Court's discomfort with American In
dian cases and supports observations that the Court treats many Amer
ican Indian cases on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis regardless of the
issue area being litigated before the Court. Taken together, these cases
also i llustrate the uncertainty of the development of federal Indian law
and the need to modify traditional methods of judicial behavior anal
ysis to allow better comparisons of American Indian interests to other
disadvantaged groups. SSQ


REFERENCES

Aurhor Interview. 20 May I 994.
Baum, Lawrence. 1 976. "Decisions to Grant and Deny Hearings in the California Supreme
Court: Pancrns in Court and Individual Behavior." Santa Clara /..aw Review I 6: 733-44.
. 1977. "Policy Goals in Judicial Gatckeeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary
Jurisdiction." American journal of Political Science 2 1 : 13-35.
---

. 1979. "Judicial Demand-Screening and Decisions on Merit: A Second Look." American

--

Politics Quarterly 7: I 09-19.

Cohen, Felix S. 1 982. Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Charlorresville, Va.:
Michie.
Cortner, Richard. 1968. "Strntcgics and Tactics of Litigants in Constirutional Cases." journal
of Public Law 1 7 : 287-307.

Cosrello, Mary. 1 980. "Indian Rights." Pp. 5 1 -58 in Edited Research Reports, ed., The Rights
Revolution. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
Deloria, Jr., Vine, and Clifford M. Lytle. 1983. American Indians, American Justice. Austin:
University of Texas Press.
Edsall, Thom:is B., and Mary D. Edsall. 1 9 9 1 . Chain Reacttan: Tl1c Impact of Race, Rights,
New York: Norron.

and Taxes on American Politics.

E.psrcin, Lee, and Karen O'Connor. 1988. "Scares and the U.S. Supreme Court: An Examination
of Litigation Outcomes." Social Science Quarterly 69: 660-74.
Foreman, Gram. 1 932. /lldian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civ1/h.ed Tribes of Indians.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Frir.i, Henry E. 1963 . The Movement for Indian Assimilation: 1860-1890. Philadelphia: Uni
versity of Pennsylvania Press.
George, Tracey, and Lee Epstein. 1992. ''On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making."

American Political Science Review 86: 323-37.

Goldman, Sheldon. 1982. Consti111tional Law and Supreme Court Decision-Making. New
York: Harper & Row.
Hagan, Willi:im T. I 993. American Indians. 3 d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

142

Social Science Quarterly

Heck, Edward

V. 1 9 8 1 .

"Civil Liberries

Voring

Patrcrns in the Burger Courr: 1 975-1978."

Westem Politteal Quarterly 34: 1 93-202.

Johnson, Ralph W. 1 990. " 'In Simple jusrice ro a Downtrodden People': Jusncc Douglas and
rhe American Indian Cases." Pp. 1 9 1-213 in Srephen L. Wnsby, ed., . .He Shall Not Pass This
Way Again": The Legacy of j11Stice William 0. Douglas. Pirrsburgh: Universiry of Pirrsburgh
Press.
Lawrence, Susan. 1 990. The Pour rn Court: The Legal Servtecs Programs and Supreme Court
Decis1011 Makmg. Princeton: Princeton Universiry Press.
O'Connor, Karen. 1 980. Women's Organizations' Use of the Courts. Lexingron, Mass.: Lex
ington Books.
O'Connor, Karen, and Lee Epstein. 1982. "The lmporrancc of lnrerest Group Involvement in
Employrnem Discrimination Liriga tion." Howard La111 journal 25 : 709-28.

. 1 983. ''Sex and the Supreme Courr: An Analysis of Judicial Support for Gender-Based
Claims." Socral Scrence Quarterly 64: 327-3 1 .

---

O'Connor, Karen, and Jeffre)• A. Segal. 1990. "Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the Supreme
Courr's Reacrion co lcs First Female Mem ber. " Women 011d Poltttcs I 0: 95-103.
Pelcyger, Roberr S. 1 983. "Justices and Indians: Back co Basics." Oregon La111 Review 62: 294.,.
Perry, H. W.,Jr.

199 1 . Dec1dmg to Decide: Agenda Settrng m the Umted States Supreme Court.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Philip, Kenneth R. 1 977. john Collier's Crusade for Jnd1a11 Reform: I 920-1 9S4. Tucson: Uni
versiry of Arizona Press.
Price. Monroe. 1 973. Law and the American fnd1a11: Readings, Notes, and Cases. New York:
Bobbs-Merrill.
Prucha, Fr:111c1s Paul. 1 974. Amenca11 l11dia11 Policy 111 Cm1s. Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press.
. J 975. Duc11me111s of Umted States Indian Policy. Lincoln: Univcrsiry of Nebraska Press.

---

. 1 984. T/Je Great 1-ather: The United States Government and the American Indians.

---

Lincoln: Umversicy of Nebraska Press.
Rohde, David W., and Harold J. Spaeth. 1 976. Supreme Court Decmu11 Makmg. San Francisco:
Freeman.
Salokar, Rebecca Mac. 1 992. The Solicrtor General: The Politics of Law. Philadelphia: Temple
Univers1ry Press.
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Att1t11d111al Model.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shattuck, Perra T .. and Jill Norgren. 1 979. ''Polnical Use of rhc Legal Process by Black and
American Indian Minorities." Howard Law journal 22: 1-26.

. 1 99 1 . Partial justtee: Federal Indian Law 111

---

a

Liberal Co11st1tut1onal System. Provi

dence, R.I.: Berg.
Sheehan, Reginald S., Donald Songer, and William Mischler. 1 992. "Ideology, Staru;, and 1hc
Differential Status of Direct Parries before rhc Supreme Court." American Political Science
Revw1u 8 6 : 464-74.

Sorauf, Frank J. 1976. The Wall o( Separatwn:
Princeton: Pnnccron Universll)' Press.

Co11st1t11timral Politics of Church and State.

American lndians and the Burger Court

143

Strickland, Renna rd. 1992. "Native Americans." Pp. 577-8 1 in Kermit L. Hall, ed., The Oxford
Companion to the Supreme Court of tbe United States. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ulmer, S. Sidney. 1 978. "Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review: An Underdog Model."
American Political Scie11ce Re11iew 72: 902- 1 0.
Ulmer, S. Sidney, and Michael Thomson. 1 98 1 . "Supreme Court Support for Black Litigants:
A Comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts." Pp. 446-54 in S. Sidn ey Ulmer, ed., Courts,
Law, a11d Judicial Processes. New York: Free Press.
Vo

c,

Clement E. 1 959. Caucas11111s 011ly. Berkeley: Univcrsiry of California Press.

Washburn, Wilcomb E. I 975a. Tbe Assault on l11dian Tribalism: Tbe Ge11eral Allotment Law
(Dawes Act) of 1887. Philadelphia: Lippi ncocr.

---. I 97.5b. The Indian 111 America. New York: Harper & Row.
Wilkins, David Eugene. 1 990. "The Legal Consc1ou�ncs� of the United Srates Supreme Court:
A Critical Examination of Indian Supreme Court Dccistons Rega rding Congressional Plenary
Power and Tribal Sovercignt)•-1 870- 1 92 1 . ·• Ph.D. dissertation. University of orth Carolina
at Chapel Hill.
Wilkinson, Charles F. 1 987. A111erica11 lndia11s, T1111e, a11d tbe Law: Natwe Societies 111 a Mod
em Co11stitutio11al Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

--. 1 990. "Justice Dougl:is and the Public Land�." Pp. 233-48 in Stephen L. Wasby, ed.,
··1-1e Slu1/I Not Pass This Way Again··, The LcgaC)• ofJustice William 0. Douglas. Pittsburgh :
University of Pircsburgh Pres�.

Woodward, Bob, and
York:

cotr Armstrong. 1 979. T/Je Brctbre11: Inside the Supreme Court. New

imon and Schuster.

Wunder, john R. 1994. '·Retamed by the People'·: A History of American /11dia11s and the Bill
of R1gbts. New York: Oxford Uni"ersity Press.

Cases Cited
C/Jcrokec Nation 11. State of Georgia, rn U.S. (5 Pee.) I ( 1 8 3 1 )
Co1111ty of 011e1da

11.

Oneida l11dian Nation. 470 U.�. 226 ( 1 985)

Ex parte Crow Dog. 109 U.S. 556 ( l 883)
Johnson 11. Mcintosh, 2 1 U.S. ( 8 Whear.) 543 ( 1 823)

Tiii! Kansas l11dia11s, 72 U.S. 737 ( I 886)
Kc1111crly

11.

District Court. 400 U.S. 423 ( 1 97 1 )

Lone Wolf 11. Hitchcock, 1 87 U.S. 553 ( l 903)
McCla11aba11 LI. Arrwna State Tax Commission, 4 1 1 U.S. 1 64 ( 1 973)
Menominee Tribe of lnd1m1s
Olipha11t

11.

L'.

U111ted Stales, 39 1 U.S. 404 ( 1 968)

Suquan11sh Tribe. 4 35 U. . 1 9 1 ( 1 978)

Ra11111h Nava10 School Board 11. Bureau of Re11e1111e. 458 U.S. 832 ( 1 982)
Rice 11. Reimer, 463 U.S. 7 l.l ( 1 983)
Santa Clara Pueblo
U111ted States

t'.

I'.

Martmez, 436 U.S. 49 ( 1 978)

Dum. 476 U.S. 734 ( 1 986)

144

Social Science Quarte.c!z.

Umted States

v.

Forty Three Gal/011s of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 1 8 8 ( 1 876).

Umted States v. Hollrdoy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 ( 1865)
Umted States 11. Kagama, 1 1 8 U.S. 375 ( 1 886)
Umted States v. Mc8rat11ey, 104 U.S. 621 ( I 8 8 1 )
Wosh111gto11
\Vi/Iiams

''·

11.

Confederated Tribes of the Yakima lnd1011 Nat1011, 439 U.S. 463 ( 1979)

Lee, 358 U.S. 217 ( 1959)

White Mountam Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 ( 1980)
\'(/orcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pee.) 5 1 5 ( 1832)

-�:

